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Abstract
We study the problem of computing personalized reserve prices in eager second price auctions
without having any assumption on valuation distributions. Here, the input is a dataset that
contains the submitted bids of n buyers in a set of auctions and the goal is to return personalized
reserve prices r that maximize the revenue earned on these auctions by running eager second
price auctions with reserve r. We present a novel LP formulation to this problem and a rounding
procedure which achieves a (1 + 2(
√
2− 1)e
√
2−2)−1 ≈ 0.684-approximation. This improves over
the 1/2-approximation algorithm due to Roughgarden and Wang. We show that our analysis is
tight for this rounding procedure. We also bound the integrality gap of the LP, which bounds
the performance of any algorithm based on this LP.
1 Introduction
Second price (Vickrey) auctions with reserves have been prevalent in many marketplaces such as
online advertising markets [GLMN17, PLPV16, CS14]. A key parameter of this auction format is
its reserve price, which is the minimum price at which the seller is willing to sell an item. While
we have a full understanding of the optimal reserve prices when the buyers’ valuation distributions
are, for example, i.i.d. and regular [Mye81]1, there are many practical applications including online
advertising markets in which these assumptions fail to hold [GLMN17, CLMN14]. Furthermore,
there are empirical and theoretical evidence that highlight the significance of setting personalized
reserve prices for the buyers in order to maximize the revenue [EOS07, OS11, BGL+18].
We study the problem of optimizing personalized reserve prices in second price auctions when
the buyer valuations can be correlated. There are two different ways that personalized reserve
prices can be applied in the second price auctions: lazy and eager [DRY15]. In the lazy version,
we first determine the potential winner and then apply the reserve prices. In the eager version, we
first apply the reserve prices and then determine the winner. In this work, we focus on optimizing
eager reserve prices because (i) while the optimal lazy reserve prices can be computed exactly in
polynomial time, they have worse revenue performance both in theory and practice, and (ii) eager
reserves perform better in terms of social efficiency for similar revenue levels [PLPV16].
To optimize the eager reserve prices, we take a data-driven approach as suggested in the liter-
ature [PLPV16, RW16]. The input in this setting is a history of the buyers’ submitted bids/val-
uations over multiple runs of an auction and the goal, roughly speaking, is to set a personalized
reserve price rb for each buyer b such that the total revenue obtained on the same data set ac-
cording to these reserve prices is maximized (see Section 2 for the formal definition). While the
problem is APX-hard [RW16], the state-of-the-art algorithm of Roughgarden and Wang [RW16]
1The seminal work of [Mye81] shows that when the buyers’ valuation distributions are i.i.d. and regular, the
monopoly price defined as arg maxr r · (1 − F (r)) for F being the buyers’ valuation distribution is optimal.
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achieves a 1/2-approximation which itself improves over an earlier 1/4-approximation algorithm by
Paes Leme, Pa´l and Vassilvitskii [PLPV16]. Our main result is an algorithm with a significantly
improved approximation factor:
Theorem (formally as Theorem 1). There exists a randomized polynomial time algorithm
that given a dataset, outputs a vector of reserve prices whose expected revenue is a 0.684-
approximation of that of the optimal value.
The known algorithms of the literature are all greedy and only take into account the two highest
bids in each auction. Another limitation of these algorithms is that the reserve price for each buyer
is computed in isolation. That is, the reserve price for a buyer only depends on the bids of the
auctions in which the buyer submits the highest bid. In fact, [RW16] argue that these limitations
are precisely what prevent their algorithm from obtaining any guarantee better than 1/2. We
bypass this bound by a careful analysis of a rounding technique for a natural linear programming
formulation of the problem proposed in this work.
The optimal data-driven reserve prices solve an offline optimization problem, i.e., given a table of
bid data, it computes the optimal reserve prices in retrospect. Such an approach, which is inspired
by practice, does not need the knowledge of valuations/bids distributions. Suppose that there is
a distribution over buyers’ valuations/bids and the goal is compute the optimal prices by having
access to samples from that distribution [MM14, HMR18]. This setting is called batch learning
in [RW16]. Using the machinery developed by Morgenstern and Roughgarden [MR15], by solving
the data-driven offline optimization problem on the dataset with Ω(|B| log |B|/2) auctions, we can
obtain 1− fraction of the maximum revenue of any eager second price auction that one could have
hoped to obtain by knowing the valuation distribution. This implies that the data-driven approach
leads to approximately optimal reserve prices in the batch learning setting.
If the value distributions are independent, an improved approximation to personalized reserves
are known via techniques like the correlation gap [Yan11, CHMS10] and prophet inequalities [KS78,
HK81, ACK18, EHLM17, BGL+18, CSZ19] (to cite a few). The latest result is 0.675-approximation
by Correa et al [CSZ19]. Although those results are typically states as an approximation ratio with
respect to the (stronger) Myerson revenue benchmark, those are also the best-known approximation
ratios with respect to the optimal reserve prices for independent distributions.
Our result and techniques Our main contribution is a polynomial-time 0.684-approximation
algorithm for the data-driven reserve prices problem with correlated distributions, improving over
the 1/2-approximation of [RW16]. This implies a (0.684 − )-algorithm for the batch learning
version of the problem using the reduction in [MR15]. It also implies a polynomial time (0.684− )-
algorithm for independent distributions, which beats the best approximation known via prophet
techniques2.
To overcome the limitation of algorithms by [PLPV16] and [RW16], we present an algorithm
called “Profile-based LP-Rounding”, Pro-LPR for short, that takes advantage of a concise repre-
sentation of the solution space. This representation, that we call profile space, is inspired by how
revenue is computed in the eager auctions. Working with the profile space enables us to consider
all the bids in an auction, not only the highest and second highest bids, to set the reserve prices.
2While we provide a better guarantee against the optimal reserves, our technique does not provide approximation
guarantees with respect to the optimal auction as prophet inequalities do.
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It further allows us to describe the optimal solution by a polynomial-size integer program. By
relaxing the integrality constraints on the variables of the integer program, we construct a linear
program (LP). The fractional solution of the LP is then rounded to obtain the reserve prices. The
final reserve price of the algorithm is the best of the zero reserves and the reserves obtained from
rounding the solution of the LP. The most technically challenging step in the analysis is to bound
the approximation ratio. This is done via careful probabilistic analysis of the rounding procedure
which leads to a non-linear mathematical program bounding the ratio. Our last step is to use tech-
niques from non-linear optimization to bound the solution of the mathematical program. We would
like to emphasize that our analysis of our algorithm is tight in a sense that there is an example for
which our algorithm cannot get an approximation factor better than 0.684.
Finally, we point out that the performance of our algorithm is evaluated against the optimal
value of the LP, which is an upper bound on the maximum revenue. By analyzing the integrality
gap of the LP, we show that no algorithm can obtain more a 0.828 fraction of the optimal value
of the LP; see Theorem 3. This highlights that our algorithm is evaluated against a powerful
benchmark and despite that, it obtains 0.684 fraction of this powerful benchmark.
Other related work Our work relates and contributes to the broad literature on revenue-
maximizing mechanisms in a single-item environment. Within that line of work, our paper is in
the intersection of two major sub-streams: (i) reserve price optimization and (ii) auction design for
correlated valuations. Most of the reserve price optimization literature has been devoted to the case
where valuations are independent, see Hartline and Roughgarden [HR09], Yan [Yan11], Dhangwat-
notai et al [DRY15] and more recently, a very fruitful line of work on posted-price and reserve-price
optimization via prophet inequalities [KS78, HK81, ACK18, EHLM17, BGL+18, CSZ19].
This work on auction design for correlated distributions pioneered by Ronen [Ron01] and Ronen
and Saberi [RS02]. The positive and negative results were later improved by Dobzinski et al [DFK11]
and Papadimitriou and Pierrakos [PP11]. Our paper departs from this line work in the sense that
we do not try to approximate the optimal incentive-compatible auction, but instead, we try to
approximate the best auction in the subclass of second price auctions with reserves. Note that this
is the auction format adopted by most online marketplaces, including online display advertising
markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the model. Section 3
presents a high level view of the results and techniques. In Section 4, we provide our LP, which
will be used as our benchmark. In Section 5, we present the LP-base algorithm and show its
performance guarantee. Section 7 provides the proof of the integrality gap and Section 6 shows
that our analysis is tight. We conclude in Section 8.
2 Preliminaries and Problem Statement
There are n buyers participating in a set of single-item eager second price auctions. Let A and B
respectively denote the set of auctions and buyers. For any buyer b ∈ B, and for any auction a ∈ A,
we are given a non-negative number βa,b which indicates the bid of buyer b in auction a. Let rb be
the personalized reserve price of buyer b ∈ B. Then, given the bids {βa,b}b∈B in auction a ∈ A and
reserve prices r = {rb}b∈B, the eager second price (ESP) auction works as follows.
- First, any buyer b with βa,b < rb is eliminated. Let Sa = {b : βa,b ≥ rb} be the set of buyers
who clear their reserve prices in auction a.
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- When set Sa is nonempty, the item is allocated to buyer b
?
a = arg maxb∈Sa {βa,b} who has
the highest bid among all the buyers in set Sa and is charged
Reva(r) := max
{
rb?a , maxb∈Sa,b6=b?a
{βa,b}
}
.
Note that Sa and b
?
a are implicitly depend on reserve prices r. Any other buyers b ∈ B, b 6= b?a
are not charged. Further, when set Sa is empty, the item is not allocated and Reva(r) = 0.
Note that the reserve prices are the same across all the auctions a ∈ A. However, each buyer b
is assigned a personalized reserve price rb. Given the dataset of bids {βa,b}a∈A,b∈B, our goal here is
to find personalized reserve prices that maximize revenue of the auctioneer. See the introduction
section for a discussion on the nice properties of this data-driven optimization. Formally, we would
like to solve the following optimization problem:
ESP? = max
r∈Rn
Rev(r) :=
∑
a∈A
Reva(r) . (ESP-OPT)
Note that, without loss of generality, we assume that the optimal reserve price for buyer b is
equal to one of his submitted bids {βa,b}a∈A. Let R = {0,∞} ∪ {βa,b}a∈A,b∈B. Then, Problem
ESP-OPT can be rewritten as maxr∈Rn
∑
a∈A Reva(r), which leads to a search space of size |R|n.
3 Results and Techniques
The main result of the paper is a randomized algorithm that returns an 0.684-approximation
solution for Problem ESP-OPT.
Theorem 1 (Main Theorem). There exists a randomized polynomial time algorithm that given
a dataset {βa,b}a∈A,b∈B, outputs a vector of eager reserve prices whose expected revenue is a
0.684-approximation of that of the optimal value of Problem ESP-OPT, denoted by ESP?.
To find an approximate solution, the overall idea is to construct an LP whose objective function
at its optimal solution provides an upper bound for ESP?. The LP that takes advantage of a
concise representation of the solution space, has a polynomial number of variables and constraints.
Then, we use a rounding technique to transform the optimal solution of the LP to a vector of reserve
prices. We show that if we consider the reserve prices obtained from the rounding technique and the
vector of all-zero reserve prices and choose the one with the maximum revenue, we obtain the desired
approximation factor. In Theorem 2, we further show that our analysis of our approximation factor
is tight. That is, we provide an example for which our algorithm obtains exactly 0.684 fraction of
the optimal value of the LP, i.e., the upper bound on for ESP?. Finally, in Theorem 3, we bound
the integrality gap of the LP. This characterization shows that no algorithm can obtain more than
0.828 fraction of the LP.
4 Linear Program
The main challenge in designing an LP formulation for this problem is to find a concise rep-
resentation of the solution space. Instead of considering all possible assignments of reserves to
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buyers, we will consider only partial assignments in which we only specify the reserve prices
of two buyers. We will call such partial assignment a profile. Formally, a profile is a tuple
p = (b1, b2, r1, r2) ∈ B × B × R × R, which represents an assignment of reserve r1 to buyer b1
and reserve r2 to buyer b2. If it is the case that the reserves are below the corresponding bids in
an auction a, i.e. r1 ≤ βa,b1 and r2 ≤ βa,b2 , then no matter how the assignment of the remaining
reserves, the revenue of this partial assignment is at least max{r1, βa,b2} for βa,b1 ≥ βa,b2 . We also
note that given any vector of reserve prices r, the revenue that can be obtained from r only depends
on the reserve price of the highest and second highest bidders that clear the reserve prices.
Next, we formally define the notion of valid profile and show that the ESP-OPT problem can
be relaxed to finding the best consistent distribution over valid profiles in each auction. To define
valid profiles, we assume that the data has two additional buyers b0 and b00 who always bid zero
which means b00, b0 ∈ B. We further elaborate on this.
Definition 4.1 (Valid Profiles). We define the set of valid profiles for auction a as the set Pa
consisting of all tuples (b1, b2, r1, r2) ∈ B× B× R× R satisfies the following conditions:
1. Bid of buyer b1 is greater than or equal to that of buyer b2; that is, βa,b1 ≥ βa,b2.
2. Buyer b1 clears his reserve; that is, βa,b1 ≥ r1.
3. Buyer b2 clears his reserve; that is, βa,b2 ≥ r2.
For any given p ∈ Pa, we define Reva(p) := max(βa,b2 , r1).
By adding buyers b0 and b00 to B, we can define valid profiles to represent the cases in which
less than two buyers cleared their reserve prices. We present the cases with one (respectively zero)
cleared buyer with valid profile of (b1, b0, r1, 0) (respectively (b0, b00, 0, 0)).
Note that we abuse notation and use Reva(·) for both revenue from reserves and revenue from
profiles. The following lemma (which follows from the preceding discussion) states that reserve
price vectors can always be mapped to a profile with the same revenue.
Lemma 4.2. Given a vector of reserve prices r and an auction a, there is a valid profile p =
(b1, b2, r1, r2) such that Reva(r) = Reva(p). Such a profile p is called the profile corresponding to
reserve price vector r.
We are now ready to describe our LP.
Decision variables of the LP: The LP will have two sets of variables:
1. For any auction a ∈ A and any valid profile p ∈ Pa, define a variable sa,p ≥ 0 such that∑
p∈Pa sa,p ≤ 1. This variable represents a probability distribution over valid profiles in
auction a. We refer to {sa,p|a ∈ A, p ∈ Pa} as a profile-solution.
2. For any buyer b ∈ B and reserve price r ∈ R,define a variable qb,r ≥ 0 such that
∑
r∈R qb,r = 1.
This variable represents be the probability that buyer b is assigned a reserve price of r.
Finally, we add constraints relating sa,p and qb,r which will ensure the consistency of probability
distributions across all profiles. To define this set of constraints, for every b ∈ B, a ∈ A, and r ∈ R,
we define set
Qb,r,a := {p = (b1, b, r1, r) : p ∈ Pa} ∪ {p = (b, b2, r, r2) : p ∈ Pa} , (1)
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which corresponds to all valid profiles of auction a that assign reserve r to buyer b. A natural
constraint to add is that the total probability assigned to profiles in Qb,r,a is at most the probability
that buyer b is assigned to reserve price r. That is,∑
p∈Qb,r,a
sa,p ≤ qb,r .
Finally, we can put it all together in the following LP:
max
q,s
∑
a∈A
∑
p∈Pa
sa,p · Reva(p)
s.t.
∑
p∈Pa
sa,p ≤ 1 ∀a : a ∈ A∑
p∈Qb,r,a
sa,p ≤ qb,r ∀a, b, r : b ∈ B, r ∈ R, a ∈ A∑
r∈R
qb,r=1 ∀b : b ∈ B
sa,p ≥ 0 ∀a, p : a ∈ A, p ∈ Pa (Profile-LP)
We start by noting that the LP is a relaxation of the ESP-OPT problem:
Lemma 4.3 (Upper bound on Revenue). The solution of Profile-LP is an upper bound to ESP?,
i.e., the optimal value of Problem ESP-OPT.
Proof. Given reserve prices r? such that ESP? =
∑
a Reva(r
?), we construct a feasible solution to
the LP as follows. For each a ∈ A, we let sa,p = 1 for the profile p corresponding to r? (according
to lemma 4.2) and sa,p = 0 for all remaining profiles. Further, we let qb,r?b = 1 and qb,r = 0 for all
remaining reserves. It is straightforward to verify that it is a feasible solution to the Profile-LP and
that
∑
a∈A
∑
p∈Pa sa,p · Reva(p) = ESP?.
5 Profile-based LP-rounding (Pro-LPR) Algorithm
In this section, we present an algorithm, called Profile-based LP-rounding (Pro-LPR), that uses the
optimal solution of (Profile-LP), s?, to devise reserve prices. Our rounding procedure is as follows:
• Construct reserve prices rR. To do so, for each buyer b ∈ B, independently sample reserve
price r ∈ R with probability proportional to qb,r.
• Let z be the vector of all zero reserves. Output the best of rR and z, i.e.,
rout ← arg max
r∈{z,rR}
Rev(r).
Now we analyze the rounding procedure and show that E[Rev(rout)] is at least a 0.684 fraction
of the solution of the Profile-LP and hence at most 0.684 · ESP?. One of the biggest strengths of our
LP formulation is that it allows the analysis to decouple the effect of rounding for each individual
auction.
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Lemma 5.1 (Two Conditions). Let s? and q? be the optimal solution of (Profile-LP) and rR be a
random reserve price obtained from the rounding procedure. If there exists a constant c > 0 such
that for any t ≥ 0 and any auctions a ∈ a, we have∑
{p:p∈Pa,Rev(p)≥t}
s?a,p − Pr [Reva(rR) ≥ t] ≤ 0 for t > β(2)a (2)∑
{p:p∈Pa,Rev(p)≥t}
s?a,p − Pr [Reva(rR) ≥ t] ≤ c for t ≤ β(2)a , (3)
then Pro-LPR algorithm is a (1 + c)−1-approximation. That is, it obtains at least (1 + c)−1 fraction
of the optimal value of Problem ESP-OPT. Here, β
(2)
a is the second highest bid in auction a and
Reva(r
R) is the revenue in auction a under reserve prices rR.
Proof of Lemma 5.1. By integrating over t in Equations (2) and (3) and adding them up, we get∫ ∞
β
(2)
a
( ∑
{p:p∈Pa Rev(p)≥t}
s?a,p − Pr [Reva(rR) ≥ t]
)
dt
+
∫ β(2)a
0
( ∑
{p:p∈Pa Rev(p)≥t}
s?a,p − Pr [Reva(rR) ≥ t]
)
dt ≤ c · β(2)a .
This is simplified as follows ∑
p∈Pa
s?a,p Reva(p)− E[Reva(rR)] ≤ c · β(2)a . (4)
Then, if
∑
a∈A β
(2)
a = x · ESP?, Equation (4) leads to∑
a∈A
∑
p∈Pa
s?a,p Reva(p)−
∑
a∈A
E[Reva(rR)] ≤ c ·
∑
a∈A
β
(2)
a = c · x · ESP? (5)
Here x ∈ (0, 1]. Note that by Lemma 4.3, the optimal value of Problem ESP-OPT, denoted by ESP?,
is upper bounded by Rev(s?). That is,
ESP? ≤ Rev(s?) =
∑
a∈A
∑
p∈Pa
s?a,p Rev(p) . (6)
Further, the revenue of Pro-LPR algorithm, i.e, E[Rev(rout)], is lower bounded by
E[Rev(rout)] ≥ max
(∑
a∈A
β
(2)
a ,E[Rev(rR)]
)
. (7)
To see why this holds note that Pro-LPR algorithm returns the best of reserve price rR and all
zero prices, where the revenue under all zero prices is the sum of the second highest highest bids∑
a∈A β
(2)
a . By using Equations (6) and (7) in (5), we have
ESP? − E[Rev(rout)] ≤ c · x · ESP? .
Invoking Equation (7) again, we have
E[Rev(rout)] ≥
∑
a∈A
β
(2)
a = x · ESP? .
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Putting these together, we have
E[Rev(rout)] ≥ max (x, 1− c · x) · ESP? ≥ 1
1 + c
· ESP? ,
which is the desired result.
By Lemma 5.1, to complete the proof of the main theorem it suffices to prove that Equation
(2) holds for any auction a ∈ A, and find a constant c that satisfies Equation (3). The following
lemma shows that Equations (2) holds.
Lemma 5.2 (First Condition Holds). Let s? denote an optimal solution of (Profile-LP) and let sR
be the profile-solution associated with the vector of reserve prices rR, defined in Pro-LPR Algorithm.
For any auction a ∈ A, we have∑
{p:p∈Pa,Rev(p)≥t}
s?a,p − Pr [Reva(rR) ≥ t] ≤ 0 for t > β(2)a . (8)
Proof. The first term in the l.h.s. of (8) can be written as∑
{p:p∈Pa,Rev(p)≥t}
s?a,p =
∑
{p:p∈Pa,p=(b(1)a ,b2,r,r2), r≥t}
s?a,p ≤
∑
r≥t
q
b
(1)
a ,r
= Pr [Reva(r
R) ≥ t] , (9)
where the first equation holds because revenue of a profile p ∈ Pa is t > β(2)a if and only if the
bidder with the highest bid in auction a, i.e., b
(1)
a , is assigned a reserve price t > β
(2)
a and the bid
of this bidder is greater than t. The second equation holds because of the second set of constraints
of (Profile-LP). The last equation follows from the construction of reserve prices rR. Note that
Equation (9) verifies condition (8).
5.1 Bounding the Constant in the Second Condition
We start by noting that the second condition in Lemma 5.1 holds trivially for c = 1, which recovers
the same approximation factor of 1/2 of [RW16]. For the rest of the paper, we will improve past
1/2 by constructing a non-linear mathematical program to optimize c and then applying the first
order conditions in non-linear programming to bound the optimal solution. In Lemma 5.3, we show
that
c = max
θ∈[0,1]
OPT(θ) ,
where for any real number θ ∈ [0, 1], OPT(θ) is defined as follows
OPT(θ) = max
x≥0
eθ−1
∏
i∈[n]
(1− xi) +
∑
i∈[n]
xi
∏
j∈[n],j 6=i
(1− xj)

s.t.
1
2
∑
i∈[n]
xi = θ
xi ≤ θ, ∀i ∈ [n] , (10)
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where n is the number of buyers. Characterizing OPT(θ) is technically involved and because of
that its details is postponed to Section 5.2. There, we show that for any number of buyers n ≥ 2
and any real number θ ∈ [0, 1],
OPT(θ) ≤ 2
(√
2− 1
)
e
√
2−2 ≈ 0.4612.
Then, invoking Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, this leads to the approximation factor of 11+0.4612 ≈ 0.6844,
which is the desired result.
In the next lemma, we formally state the relationship between OPT(θ) and the approximation
factor of our algorithm.
Lemma 5.3 (Second Condition). Let s? denote an optimal solution of Profile-LP and rR be the
vector of reserve prices, defined in Pro-LPR Algorithm. Let
c = max
θ∈[0,1]
OPT(θ) .
Then, for any auction a ∈ A, the following equation holds.∑
{p:p∈Pa,Rev(p)≥t}
s?a,p − Pr [Reva(rR) ≥ t] ≤ c for t ≤ β(2)a .
To show Lemma 5.3, we make use of the following lemma.
Lemma 5.4. Given fixed x1,b, x2,b with b ∈ B and x1,b + x2,b ≤ 1, the following inequality holds:
∏
b∈B
(1−x1,b−x2,b)+
∑
b∈B
x2,b
∏
b′ 6=b
(1−x1,b′−x2,b′) ≤
∏
b∈B
(1−x1,b)
∏
b∈B
(1− x2,b) +
∑
b∈B
x2,b
∏
b′ 6=b
(1− x2,b′)

The proof of Lemma 5.4 is provided at the end of this section. Before it, we use Lemma 5.4 to
prove Lemma 5.3.
Proof of Lemma 5.3. We start with a few definitions. Consider a certain auction a ∈ A and all
of its valid profiles p ∈ Pa. Fix some threshold t ≤ β(2)a and an optimal solution of (Profile-LP),
denoted by s?. Consider a buyer b ∈ B. Then, define
X ′1,b = {p = (b, b2, r1, r2) : p ∈ Pa, r1 ≥ t}
X ′′1,b = {p = (b1, b, r1, r2) : p ∈ Pa, r1 < t and r2 ≥ t}
X2,b = {p = (b1, b2, r1, r2) : p ∈ Pa, b ∈ {b1, b2}, r1, r2 < t and βa,b2 ≥ t}
and then set:
x1,b =
∑
p∈X ′1,b∪X′′1,b
s?a,p and x2,b =
∑
p∈X2,b
s?a,p .
We note that X ′1,b is the set of all valid profiles p = (b, b2, r1, r2) in which reserve of buyer b is
at least t. X ′′1,b is the set of all valid profiles p = (b1, b, r1, r2) in which reserve of buyer b1 is less
than t and reserve of buyer b is greater than or equal to t. Observe that for all the profiles p in
X ′1,b ∪ X ′′1,b, reserve of buyer b is at least t. This implies that for all of these profiles, Rev(p) ≥ t.
We also note that X2,b is the set of all valid profiles p = (b1, b2, r1, r2) such that buyer b ∈ {b1, b2}
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and bid of buyer b2 is at least t. Again, it is easy to see that for any valid profile p ∈ X2,b, we have
Rev(p) ≥ t. Finally, we point that while any profile p in X2,b and X ′1,b ∪ X ′′1,b has Rev(p) ≥ t, by
construction, X2,b and X ′1,b ∪ X ′′1,b are disjoint. Therefore, we have∑
{p: p∈Pa, Rev(p)≥t}
s?a,p =
∑
b∈B
x1,b +
1
2
∑
b∈B
x2,b , (11)
where the coefficient 12 accounts for double-counting. That is, while any profile p in X
′
1,b ∪ X ′′1,b
contributes to s?a,p once, any profile p in X2,b contributes to s
?
a,p twice.
Define y1,b as the probability that the sampled reserve of buyer b, i.e., r
R
b , is in [t, βa,b] and y2,b
as the probability that the sampled reserve rRb is in [0, t). By the sampling procedure we know that:
y1,b ≥ x1,b and y2,b ≥ x2,b .
Observe that Reva(r
R) ≥ t iff at least one of the two following events happen.
Event E1: There exists a buyer with a reserve of at least t whose bid is cleared.
Event E2: There are at least two buyers with cleared bids greater than or equal to t.
Precisely,
Pr [Reva(r
R) ≥ t] = Pr[E1 or E2] = Pr[E1] + Pr[E2 and E¯1] = Pr[E1] + Pr[E¯1] Pr[E2|E¯1] , (12)
where
Pr[E1] = 1−
∏
b∈B
(1− y1,b)
and
Pr[E2|E¯1] = 1−
∏
b∈B
(1− y˜2,b)−
∑
b∈B
y˜2,b
∏
b′ 6=b
(1− y˜2,b′) for y˜2,b = y2,b
1− y1,b
This gives us
Pr[E2 and E¯1] = Pr[E¯1] Pr[E2|E¯1] = Pr[E¯1]−
∏
b∈B
(1− y1,b − y2,b)−
∑
b∈B
y2,b
∏
b′ 6=b
(1− y1,b′ − y2,b′) .
Thus, by Equation (12), we get
Pr[E2 or E1] = 1−
∏
b∈B
(1− y1,b − y2,b)−
∑
b∈B
y2,b
∏
b′ 6=b
(1− y1,b′ − y2,b′) .
Now observe that the expression above, i.e., Pr[E2 or E1], is increasing in both y1,b and y2,b, b ∈ B.
To see why Pr[E2 or E1] is increasing in y2,b, note that
∂(Pr[E2 or E1])
∂y2,b
=
∑
b′∈B,b′ 6=b
y2,b′
∏
b′′ 6=b,b′
(1− y1,b′′ − y2,b′′) ≥ 0 .
This implies that:
Pr[E2 or E1] ≥ 1−
∏
b∈B
(1− x1,b − x2,b)−
∑
b∈B
x2,b
∏
b′ 6=b
(1− x1,b′ − x2,b′) .
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We now invoke Lemma 5.4, stated earlier, to get
Pr[E2 or E1] ≥ 1−
∏
b∈B
(1− x1,b)
∏
b∈B
(1− x2,b) +
∑
b∈B
x2,b
∏
b′ 6=b
(1− x2,b′)
 . (13)
Using Equations (11), (13), and (12), we get∑
{p:p∈Pa,Rev(p)≥t}
s?a,p − Pr [Reva(rR) ≥ t] ≤
∑
b∈B
x1,b +
1
2
∑
b∈B
x2,b −
1−∏
b∈B
(1− x1,b)
∏
b∈B
(1− x2,b) +
∑
b∈B
x2,b
∏
b′ 6=b
(1− x2,b′)
 (14)
It easy to check that for any b ∈ B, the above expression is non-decreasing in x1,b. This allows that
to assume without loss of generality3 that
∑
b∈B x1,b +
1
2
∑
b∈B x2,b= 1.
As a result, we have
∑
{p:p∈Pa,Rev(p)≥t}
s?a,p − Pr [Reva(rR) ≥ t] ≤
∏
b∈B
(1− x1,b)
∏
b∈B
(1− x2,b) +
∑
b∈B
x2,b
∏
b′ 6=b
(1− x2,b′)
 ,
where
∑
b∈B x2,b = 2θ,
∑
b∈B x1,b = 1 − θ. Here, θ ∈ [0, 1]. To complete the proof, we simply use
that:
∏
b∈B(1 − x1,b) ≤ e−
∑
b∈Bx1,b = eθ−1. Given how we constructed the variables x2,b, we also
need x2,b ≤ θ. Hence,
∑
{p:p∈Pa,Rev(p)≥t}
s?a,p − Pr [Reva(rR) ≥ t] ≤ eθ−1
∏
b∈B
(1− x2,b) +
∑
b∈B
x2,b
∏
b′ 6=b
(1− x2,b′)

where
∑
b∈B x2,b = 2θ and x2,b ≤ θ for any b ∈ B.
Proof of Lemma 5.4. Given a partition of B in two sets B1,B2, define the following function:
Φ(B1,B2) =
∏
b∈B1
(1− x1,b)(1− x2,b)
∏
b∈B2
(1− x1,b − x2,b)+
∑
b∈B1∪B2
x2,b
 ∏
b′∈B1,b′ 6=b
(1− x1,b)(1− x2,b)
∏
b′∈B2,b′ 6=b
(1− x1,b − x2,b)

The main claim in the lemma is that Φ(B, ∅) ≥ Φ(∅,B). We will show that for any B1,B2 and
bˆ ∈ B2, we have
Φ(B1,B2) ≤ Φ(B1 ∪ {bˆ},B2 \ {bˆ})
and the claim will follow by moving the elements from B2 to B1 one by one. To simplify notation,
define
w =
∏
b∈B1
(1− x1,b)(1− x2,b)
∏
b∈B2\{bˆ}
(1− x1,b − x2,b)
3To see why, suppose that
∑
b∈B x1,b +
1
2
∑
b∈B x2,b = 1 − δ, where δ > 0. Then, by replacing x1,b with x′1,b :=
x1,b + δ, the r.h.s. of Equation (14) can only increase. Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume that∑
b∈B x1,b +
1
2
∑
b∈B x2,b = 1.
11
Now we can write:
Φ(B1,B2) = w·(1−x1,bˆ−x2,bˆ)+w·x2,bˆ+
∑
b∈B2;b6=bˆ
w·
1− x1,bˆ − x2,bˆ
1− x1,b − x2,b ·x2,b+
∑
b∈B1
w·
1− x1,bˆ − x2,bˆ
(1− x1,b)(1− x2,b) ·x2,b
and
Φ(B1 ∪ {bˆ},B2 \ {bˆ}) = w · (1− x1,bˆ)(1− x2,bˆ) + w · x2,bˆ
+
∑
b∈B2;b6=bˆ
w ·
(1− x1,bˆ)(1− x2,bˆ)
1− x1,b − x2,b · x2,b +
∑
b∈B1
w ·
(1− x1,bˆ)(1− x2,bˆ)
(1− x1,b)(1− x2,b) · x2,b
Our goal here is to show Φ(B1,B2) ≤ Φ(B1 ∪ {bˆ},B2 \ {bˆ}). We start with comparing the first two
terms of Φ(B1,B2) and Φ(B1 ∪ {bˆ},B2 \ {bˆ}):
w ·(1−x1,bˆ−x2,bˆ)+w ·x2,bˆ = w ·(1−x1,bˆ) ≤ w ·(1−x1,bˆ+x1,bˆx2,bˆ) = w ·(1−x1,bˆ)(1−x2,bˆ)+w ·x2,bˆ .
We can compare the remaining terms one by one using the fact that:
1− x1,bˆ − x2,bˆ ≤ (1− x1,bˆ)(1− x2,bˆ) .
This concludes that Φ(B1,B2) ≤ Φ(B1 ∪ {bˆ},B2 \ {bˆ}) as desired.
5.2 Approximation Factor
In this section, we will show that for any given θ ∈ [0, 1], we have
OPT(θ) ≤ 2
(√
2− 1
)
e
√
2−2 ,
where OPT(θ) is defined in Equation (10). Since the constraints of Program (10) are linear in xi’s,
the first order conditions of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) are a necessary condition for optimality
[Ber99]. Let
F (x, θ) = eθ−1
∏
i∈[n]
(1− xi) +
∑
i∈[n]
xi
∏
j∈[n],j 6=i
(1− xj)
 .
Observe that F (x, θ) is the objective function of OPT(θ). Then, according to the KKT conditions,
the optimal solution must satisfy the following constraints for some λ ∈ R, µ, η ∈ Rn+:
∇xF (x, θ) + λ
2
1− µ+ η = 0 (15)∑
i∈[n]
xi =
1
2
θ (16)
µi(xi − θ) = 0, ∀i ∈ [n] (17)
ηixi = 0, ∀i ∈ [n] (18)
0 ≤ xi ≤ θ, ∀i ∈ [n] (19)
where 1 ∈ Rn is the vector of all one.
It is enough to show that F (x, θ) ≤ 2 (√2− 1) e√2−2 for any tuple (x, θ, λ, µ, η) satisfying the
KKT conditions. A simple consequence of the KKT condition is the following:
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Lemma 5.5. If (x, θ, λ, µ, η) satisfies the KKT conditions for Problem (10), then if xk and xt are
such that 0 < xk < θ and 0 < xt < θ, then xk = xt.
Proof. By conditions (17) and (18), we must have µk = ηk = 0. Plugging that into condition (15),
we get that ∂F/∂xk + λ/2 = 0. This implies that∑
i 6=k
xi
∏
j 6=i,k
(1− xj) + λ
2
= 0 .
Let Q =
∏
i∈[n](1− xi) and S =
∑
i∈[n]
xi
1−xi . Then, the above condition can be written as
Q
1− xk
∑
i 6=k
xi
1− xi +
λ
2
= 0 ⇒ Q
1− xk (S −
xk
1− xk ) +
λ
2
= 0 .
This is further simplified as follows(
SQ+
λ
2
)− (SQ+Q+ λ)xk + λ
2
x2k = 0 .
The polynomial p(y) :=
(
SQ + λ2
) − (SQ + Q + λ)y + λ2y2 is quadratic with d2pd2y ≥ 0 and p(1) =
−Q < 0. Thus, p(y) = 0 has an unique solution with y < 1. This implies xk is uniquely determined
as a function of S, Q, and λ. By the same argument, xt is also a solution to the same equation and
hence xk = xt.
Lemma 5.5 leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 5.6. We can bound OPT(θ) ≤ maxk∈Z,k≥2 max[OPT1(θ, k),OPT2(θ, k)] where:
OPT1(θ, k) = eθ−1
(
1− 2θ
k
)k−1(
1− 2θ
k
+ 2θ
)
OPT2(θ, k) = eθ−1
[(
1− θ
k
)k
+ θ(1− θ)
(
1− θ
k
)k−1]
Proof. As stated earlier, in order to maximize the objective function OPT(θ), it is enough to
consider feasible solutions x satisfying the KKT conditions. To do so, we use Lemma 5.5 to narrow
down such solutions.
Since for any i ∈ [n], xi ≤ θ and
∑
i∈[n] xi = 2θ, we an only have the following three cases:
• Case 1: Two variables in the support have value θ and by constraint
∑
i∈[n] xi = 2θ, the rest
of them are zero. In that case, OPT(θ) = OPT1(θ, 2).
• Case 2: One variable has value θ and by Lemma 5.5, the rest n − 1 ≥ 2 variables in the
support have value θ/(n− 1). In that case, OPT(θ) = OPT2(θ, n− 1).
• Case 3: All variables in the support are strictly below θ. In this case, by Lemma 5.5, xi = θ/n
for n ≥ 3, and the solution is OPT(θ) = OPT1(θ, n).
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Lemma 5.7. For any θ ∈ [0, 1] and k ≥ 2, we have OPT1(θ, k) ≤ 2 (√2− 1) e√2−2.
Proof. For each k ≥ 0, define θ∗(k) = arg maxθ∈[0,1] OPT1(θ, k). By solving ∂OPT1(θ, k)/∂θ = 0
we obtain the following expression for θ∗(k):
k2(2θ∗(k)− 1) + 4(k − 1)(θ∗(k))2 = 0 .
The aforementioned equation has two solutions, only one of which is in [0, 1]. Thus,
θ∗(k) =
k
(
k −√k2 + 4k − 4
)
4− 4k . (20)
We need to show that for any k ≥ 2, we have OPT1(θ∗(k), k) ≤ 2 (√2− 1) e√2−2 ≈ 0.461. For
k = 2, we have OPT1(θ∗(k), k) = 2
(√
2− 1) e√2−2. For k < 40 we can verify this inequality
numerically. For k ≥ 40, we define and upper bound:
U(θ, k) =
2θ + 1
eθ+1(1− 2θk )
.
and show that for any θ ∈ [0, 1] and k ≥ 40:
OPT1(θ, k) ≤ U(θ, k) ≤ U(θ, 40) ≤ 0.459 < 2
(√
2− 1
)
e
√
2−2 .
For the first inequality note that:
OPT1(θ, k) =eθ−1
[(
1− 2θ
k
)k−1(
1 + (k − 1)2θ
k
)]
< eθ−1
[(
1− 2θ
k
)k (
1− 2θ
k
)−1
(1 + 2θ)
]
≤ U(θ, k).
(21)
For the second inequality, we use the fact that for any θ, U(θ, k) is decreasing in k. To find an
upper-bound for value of U(θ, 40) = (2θ+1)
eθ+1(1− θ
20
)
, we take derivative of that which is
∂U(θ, 40)
∂θ
=
20
(
2θ2 − 39θ + 21)
eθ+1(θ − 20)2
By solving ∂U(θ,40)∂θ = 0, we obtain that maximum of U(θ, 40) is at θ =
1
4
(
39−√1353) and
U
(
1
4
(
39−
√
1353
)
, 40
)
< 0.459 .
This completes the proof.
Lemma 5.8. For any θ ∈ [0, 1] and k ≥ 2, we have OPT2(θ, k) ≤ 0.46 < 2 (√2− 1) e√2−2.
Proof. Observe that
e1−θOPT2(θ, k) =
(
1− θ
k
)k
+ θ(1− θ)
(
1− θ
k
)k−1
≤
(
1− θ
k
)k
+
1
4
(
1− θ
k
)k
=
5
4
(
1− θ
k
)k
,
(22)
where the first inequality holds because maxθ∈[0,1] θ(1 − θ) = 14 and 1 − θk ≤ 1. Finally, note
that eθ−1 · 54(1 − θk )k is decreasing for θ ∈ [0, 1], Thus, we can bound OPT2(θ, k) by the value of
eθ−1 · 54(1− θk )k at θ = 0 which is 5/(4e) < 0.46.
14
6 Tightness of the analysis
In this section, we show that the analysis of our algorithm is tight, i.e., we construct an example
for which the performance of the algorithm matches the 0.684 factor approximation.
To make the construction cleaner, we can define the weighted version of our problem in which
each auction a ∈ A has an associated weight wa > 0, and the objective is to maximize
∑
a∈Awa ·
Reva(r). Note that if the weights are integers, this is exactly the same as the original problem,
replacing each weighted auction by wa (unweighted) copies. Even if wa’s are not integers, it is easy
to see that the algorithm and the analysis generalize with essentially no change to the weighted
case (the only modification involves adding weighs to the objective function in the LP). In other
words, if the objective were the weighted revenue, we would still get 0.684 approximation factor by
applying a similar algorithm. Furthermore, any lower bound to the weighted case translates to the
unweighted case by replacing a weighted auction a by bNwac unweighted copies for some large N .
Theorem 2. There is a weighted instance {wa}a∈A, {βa,b}a∈A,b∈B and an optimal LP solution s,q
such that
max
(
E
[∑
a
wa Reva(r
R)
]
,
∑
a
wa Reva(0)
)
≤ 0.684 · Rev(s)
Proof. Fix θ =
√
2 − 1 and c = (1 − θ2)eθ−1. Consider an instance with three weighted auctions
and n = k + 3 buyers described by the following table:
XXXXXXXXXXXWeights wa
Bids
βa,1 . . . βa,k βa,k+1 βa,k+2 βa,k+3
1/(c+ 1) 1 . . . 1 1 1 0
c/(c+ 1) 0 . . . 0 0 0 1 + 
 1 +  . . . 1 +  1 +  1 +  0
Now, consider the following solution to the Profile-LP. For the first auction,
• the profile p = (i, 0, 1, 0) has sa,p = (1 − θ)/k for i ∈ [k]. In this profile, the i-th buyer is
reserve priced at 1 and the second buyer is the dummy buyer.
• the profile p = (k + 1, k + 2, 0, 0) has weight sa,p = θ. In this profile, both buyers k + 1 and
k + 2 have zero reserve prices. Observe that the revenue under this profile is 1 due to the
highest second price.
For the second auction, we consider only one profile:
• the profile p = (k + 3, 0, 1 + , 0) has sa,p = 1. In this profile, the (k + 3)-th buyer is reserve
prices at 1 and the second buyer is the dummy buyer.
And for the third auction we have:
• the profile p = (i, 0, 1 + , 0) has sa,p = θ/k for i ∈ [k]. In this profile, the i-th buyer is reserve
priced at 1 +  and the second buyer is the dummy buyer.
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• the profile p = (k + 1, k + 2, 1 + , 1 + ) has weight sa,p = 1− θ. In this profile, both buyers
k + 1 and k + 2 have reserve price 1 +  and thus the revenue is 1 + .
For this solution, we define the q variables as follows.
• For buyers i ∈ [k], we set qi,1 = (1− θ)/k and qi,1+ = 1− qi,1.
• For buyers i = k + 1, k + 2, we set qi,0 = θ and qi,1+ = 1− qi,1.
• For buyer k + 3, we set qk+3,1+ = 1.
It is easy to see that this solution is feasible and that it is the optimal solution Profile-LP. This
is so because for any auction, any profile that has a positive weight yield the maximum revenue
for that auction. Note that for simplicity in the formulation of revenue, we can remove the terms
that are a factor of  since they can be arbitrary small and are negligible. Now we argue that
the rounding procedure produces a 1/(c + 1) approximation. First notice that the vector of zero
reserves obtains revenue 1/(c+ 1).
Now, we compute the expected revenue from rounding.After rounding, the reserve of any buyer
i ∈ [k] is either 1 or 1 + , the reserve of buyers k + 1 and k + 2 is either zero or 1 + , and reserve
of buyer k + 3 is always 1 + . Thus, the expected revenue from rounding is given by
1
c+ 1
[
1−
(
1− 1− θ
k
)k
· (1− θ2)
]
+
c
c+ 1
,
where the first term is the revenue of first auction and the second term, i.e., cc+1 , is the revenue
of the second auction.4 To see why the latter holds note that in the first auction, we always get a
revenue of one unless none of the first k buyers have a reserve of one and neither buyers k + 1 nor
buyer k + 2 have a reserve of zero. As k →∞, the expected revenue after rounding becomes:
1
c+ 1
[
1− eθ−1 · (1− θ2)
]
+
c
c+ 1
=
1− c
c+ 1
+
c
c+ 1
=
1
c+ 1
,
where the first equation holds because c = (1 − θ2)eθ−1. The above equation is the desired result
because the optimal revenue is at most 1 and 1/(c + 1) = 0.684. The latter follows from c =
(1− θ2)eθ−1 and θ = √2.
7 Integrality Gap
In the previous section, we showed an instance for which our algorithm obtains exactly an 0.684-
factor of the optimal solution. This can be conceivably be improved by either a better rounding
procedure or a smart way to select an optimal LP solution. In this section, we show a bound of
0.828, which says that any rounding procedure for this LP formulation will obtain at most 0.828 of
the optimal value of the LP.
4We do not include the revenue of the third auction because we would like to take  to zero and in that case, the
revenue of the third auction approaches zero.
16
Theorem 3 (Integrality Gap of Profile-LP). There exists a dataset of bids {βa,b}a∈A,b∈B for which
the integrality gap of the LP is at least 2(
√
2− 1) ≈ 0.828. That is,
ESP? ≤ 2(
√
2− 1)LP?
where LP? is the optimal fraction solution of the Profile-LP and ESP? is the optimal integral solution.
Proof. Given n buyers, an integer k > 0, δ = 1/k and a constant λ ∈ (0, 1) to be determined later,
consider an instance built as follows:
• Type one auctions: For any buyer, b ∈ [n], we have an auction in which all the bids are zero
except the bid of buyer b. Precisely, buyer b has a bid of λn.
• Type two auctions: For any pair of buyers b1 and b2, there are k copies of an auction in
which b1 and b2 bid δ = 1/k and the rest of the buyers bid 0. We assume that λn > δ.
For this instance, consider the fractional solution that assigns sa,p = 1/2 for any auction a of
type two and profiles (b1, b0, δ, 0) and (b2, b0, δ, 0). For the rest of the valid profiles of auction a,
we set sa,p to zero. Note that b1 and b2 are the buyers with nonzero bids in auction a and b0 is an
auxiliary buyer. Moreover, for any auction a of type one, in which buyer b has a nonzero bid, we
have sa,p = 1/2 for profile p = (b, b0, λn, 0). For the rest of the valid profiles of this auction, we set
sa,p to zero. In this solution for any buyer b, we have qb,δ = 1/2 and qb,λn = 1/2. One can simply
verify that this solution satisfies all the constraints of the LP and as a result, it is a valid fractional
solution. The optimal value of the LP is therefore bounded by:
LP? ≥
∑
a
Reva(s) = n · λ
2
n+
(
n
2
)
· k · δ = 1 + λ
2
· n2 + o(n2) ,
where the first term corresponds to the revenue from auctions of type one and the second term
corresponds to the revenue of auctions of type two. To bound ESP?, we note that in the optimal
solution of Problem (ESP-OPT), the reserve of each buyer is either δ or λn. Given that the buyers
are symmetric, the value of the optimal solution depends only on the number of buyers with each
reserve. Let t be the number of buyers with reserve λn. Then, we can write:
ESP? = max
0≤t≤n
[
t · λn+ (n− t) · δ +
(
n
2
)
−
(
t
2
)]
.
By taking δ → 0, we obtain,
ESP? = max
0≤t≤n
[
t · λn+
(
n
2
)
−
(
t
2
)]
.
Since the term inside the maximum is a quadratic function of t, the optimal integral solution
should be t = λn+ o(n), since the optimal integral solution t deviates from the optimal fractional
solution (which is λn+ 1/2) by at most 1. Substituting that in the expression of ESP?, we get:
ESP? =
1 + λ2
2
· n2 + o(n2) .
Taking n→∞, we get:
ESP?
LP?
≤ (1 + λ
2)n2 + o(n2)
(1 + λ)n2 + o(n2)
→ 1 + λ
2
1 + λ
.
We can choose the parameter λ =
√
2− 1 to minimize the above expression, which leads to a ratio
of 2(
√
2− 1) ≈ 0.828.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper, we take a data-driven approach to optimize personalized reserve prices in the eager
second price auction. We design a polynomial time LP-based algorithm to optimize reserve prices
on a given dataset of submitted bids and show that our algorithm obtains more than 0.684 fraction
of the optimal revenue. This improves upon the best known approximation factor due to [RW16].
We believe that our data-driven approach as well as our LP-based algorithm can also be applied
to a wider class of problems with revenue objective.
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